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TRUST FUND PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK MECHANICS
LIEN LAW
HowARD L. MEYER4:
7 THE idea of a trust is so familiar to us all that we never wonder at it. And
I yet surely we ought to wonder. If we were asked what is the greatest
and most distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of
jurisprudence I cannot think that we should have any better answer to give
than this, namely, the development from century to century of the trust idea."
Inl. Maitland, Collected Papers 272 (1911).
The trust device was originally utilized to impress upon a certain genus
of debtor the highest duty of fidelity and care to his creditors. Conversly, the
creditor has been denominated a cestui que use and has been armed with the
most potent weapons known to the civil law in order to enforce these rights,
not only against his trustee, but also against persons who deal with or act on
the behalf of the trustee to the detriment of the cestii. The courts originally
recognized the concept of trustee-beneficiary in order to require parties having
legal title to land to hold these lands for the profit of the beneficiaries and
not themselves.' The trustees likely were endowed with legal title for the sole
purpose of avoiding some medieval restraint on alienation or in order to
escape a vexatious inheritance tax.2 If in breach of their duties to the beneficial
owner, the trustee pre-empted the property to his own use, he would be forced
to return it and account for the profits. Similarly, one who by fraud or theft
appropriated money, property, or even a business opportunity to his own
use became a trustee de son tort and was held by a legal fiction to be reaping
any profits for the benefit of his cestui.3
The traditional rights of a cestui que use as distinguished from the rights
of mere creditors are as follows:
(1) The cestui may follow the trust funds to the hands of a person who
received them with knowledge of their source and notice that the payment was
a breach of the trustees duties. This is true even though that person gave
value for the trust funds received.4
(2) The officers, directors and agents of a corporate trustee who consent
to the diversion of known trust funds will be personally liable. This result
follows though the guilty officers, etc., derive no personal profit from the
diversion and in fact the funds are expended for proper corporate purposes.r
(3) The beneficiary of the trust in the event of bankruptcy of the trustee
* Member of the New York State Bar.
1. I Scott, Trusts §§ 1-1.6 (2d ed. 1956).
2. Id. passim.
3. Id. §§ 462-.6.
4. III Scott, Trusts § 288 (2d ed. 1956).
5. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 1141 (perm. ed.).
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may claim the identifiable trust funds as his own property, not subject to the
bankrupt's liabilities.6
(4) Certain categories of defaulting trustees cannot erase their liabilities
to their beneficiaries by means of a discharge in bankruptcy.7
This elementary rehearsal of the tenets of trust law is offered to the reader
as an aide memoir. It will be helpful to keep in mind for the New York legis-
lature has declared that funds received or to become due to the owner, contrac-
tor, and sub-contractor by reason for an improvement to real property are
"'trust funds" to be paid only to those who have provided the where-with-all
-which made possible the improvement. These persons are the "beneficiaries"
-of the "trust" and any payment made to a party other than a "beneficiary" is
a diversion of the trust and punishable as a larceny.9 The legislature has
6. 4 Collier, Bankruptcy II 70.25 (14th ed. 1956).
7. II Scott, Trusts § 221 (2d ed. 1956).
8. In declaring these persons to be "trustees" the laws requirements have been some-
-what relaxed since the time when it was written:
"The office of Cestud que Trust
Is reserved for the learned and just.
Any villain you choose
May be Cestui que Use
But a Lawyer for Cestui que Trust."
Belloc, Cautionary Verses 376 (1959).
9. The sections dealing with the civil aspects of the trust are contained in N.Y. Lien
law §§ 70-79, the penal provision is now found in N.Y. Penal Law § 1302-c. Briefly,
'The Lien Law sections provide as follows: Section 70; the funds received or to become
-due to an owner, contractor or subcontractor in connection with a contract for the
improvement of real property are to be considered trust funds, the trust arises when
any asset comes into existence. Section 71; The trust assets must be disbursed in pay-
nent of the claims of the contractors, subcontractors, architects, engineers, surveyors,
laborers and materialmen who made possible the construction. The section also allows
the payment of trust funds for purposes which are non-lienable, i.e., premium payments
,on liability and surety bonds relating to the improvement, various taxes, unemployment
.contributions and wage supplements which relate to the construction.
Section 72; Payment of the trust funds for other purposes than those recited in sec-
tion 71 is a diversion of trust assets which the trustee is under a duty to prevent. Any
trust claimant is permitted to intervene in an action which might result in a diversion.
However, nothing contained herein is to affect the rights of a holder in due course or
-a purchaser for value.
Section 73; A party who takes as security an assignment of trust funds to become
,due must file a "notice of lending" with the County Clerk wherein the property giving
rise to the trust is located, or if a public improvement, with the head of the department
having charge of the work and the disbursing officer. Also the assignee must prove that
-the moneys he advanced in consideration of the assignment were in fact used to discharge
trust claims. If all of the above requirements are not met, the assignment falls and the
amounts the lender has received thereunder must be returned to the proper trust claimants.
Section 74; The trustee may disburse trust assets amongst beneficiaries in the manner
'he determines until a court orders otherwise.
Section 75; The trustee need not segregate trust funds and may deposit them in his
regular account. However, he must keep meticulous records showing trust assets received
zand receivable, and trust obligations paid and payable. Failure to keep such books as
required by this section will be presumptive evidence that the trustee has allowed a diver-
:sion of trust assets.
Section 76; allows a trust beneficiary who has been unpaid for 30 days the right to
-examine and copy these books.
Section 77; the trust arising by reason of this article may be enforced by any beneficiary
'but he must bring his suit as a class action on behalf of all unpaid job claimants and
-within one year of the completion of the improvement. The action once brought may not
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evidenced a constant and growing concern to protect and assure payment to
the persons who made possible the actual improvement of real property.10
Owners, contractors and subcontractors because of their need for large amounts
of capital for construction have been able to deal with enormous amounts of
liquid funds. These funds were intended to pay for the cost of the improvement
but the recipients have often expended these moneys for other uses. This
spelled ruin for their job creditors. In order to halt this practice, so debilitating
to the entire construction industry, the legislature declared that the diversion
of such trust funds should henceforth be criminal" and the district attorney
was empowered to collect as a fine, the sum diverted plus twenty percent (20%)
and pay this over to the injured party. 12 In fact these provisions had little
effect because district attorneys were not inclined to prosecute businessmen
whose only crime appeared to be that of failing to pay their creditors. The
section providing for a fine has apparently never been invoked in a reported
case and it would be a rare defaulter who stood in the felons dock because he
was unable to pay his job creditors and yet was able to pay a fine equal to
the amount he diverted and add twenty percent (20%) thereto.
The New York Courts further weakened the effect of the statute when
they determined that these penal provisions did not create a "trust" for civil
purposes, 13 hence the unpaid job creditor was relegated to the criminal penalty.
This deficiency was overcome by the legislature when in 1942 they amended
the law to state that henceforth a civil remedy would exist.' 4 The most recent
substantial amendment of the law was made in 1959,1r one of the purposes of
which was to overcome a decision that the legislature felt to be hostile to the
proper workings of the law.' 0 This decision will be discussed further in the
treatment of parties who receive diverted trust funds. The other major change
was enacted to meet the problem of banks lending money to a contractor and
taking back as security an assignment of all moneys to become due by reason of
the construction. The contractor would often take the money provided by the
be discontinued without approval of the court. In disbursing trust assets the court shall
give preference to trust claims for: (a) taxes and withholding; (b) laborer's and weekly
wages; (c) wage benefits and supplement; (d) the assignee of wage claims.
Section 78; a trust beneficiary having a judgment shall not levy upon trust assets ofhis debtor; if he does so he shall be deemed to bold the proceeds for the benefit of other
trust claimants.
Section 79; Nothing in these sections is to affect the remedies of a claimant under
the mechanics lien sections of the law.
Section 1302-c of the Penal Law makes a trustee who diverts, or the officer, director
or agent of such trustee who applies or consents to the diversion of trust funds, guilty
of a felony.
10. 1959 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), 1958 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), 1942 Leg. Doc. No. 65(H).
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 515, § 2 (made diversion by owner a misdemeanor); N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 859, § 17 (made diversion by any trustee a felony).
12. N.Y. Penal Law § 1302.
13. E.g., Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Fed. Bk. & Tr. Co., 288 N.Y. 452, 43 N.E.2d
486 (1942), aff'd on rehearing, 290 N.Y. 611, 48 N.E.2d 709 (1943).
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, ch. 808, § 2.
15. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 696, § 2.
16. 1959 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F) 54 (238).
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bank and expend it elsewhere meanwhile subcontracting out large portions of
the work and providing the materials for the improvement by receiving credit
from suppliers. When the time came for payment the subcontractor and supplier
found that the funds due from the owner or contractor to their debtor had
been assigned away to a bank or other lender; to combat this pernicious
practice the legislature as early as 1896 required that these assignments
must be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the construction
took place, 17 or if the work were that of a government agency the assignment
was to be filed with the agency in question.18 The result of failure to file was
not only to invalidate the assignment as to future payments but also the lender
was to disgorge to the job claimants any sums he had collected under the
unrecorded assignment. These provisions received varying interpretations. One
line of cases afforded the lender who had not filed an equitable setoff to the
amount he could prove his borrower had in fact used to discharge trust claims.19
Another line of cases required as a prerequisite to the retention of any moneys,
the proper filing of the assignment.2 0
By this device the legislature hoped that job claimants would be able to
protect themselves by searching the appropriate records to see if the funds
from the job upon which they were working had been assigned away. This
provision was also evidently found inadequate for the legislature imposed even
stricter requirements in the 1959 amendment. The law now requires that
not only must the lender properly file his assignment but he must also see
that the money he lends in fact goes to pay trust claims.21 He is afforded a
defense to an action for restitution only to that extent. This is obviously a
significant change in the status of the law. Yet the most dramatic change is
wrought by the legislature's declaration that the relationship of job creditors
and job debtors is one of "trustee" and "beneficiary." Does this mean that the
job creditor may lay claim to all the ancient and powerful rights with which
the cestul que use has historically been armed? The discussion of this question
is the burden of this article.
LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES WHO REcEIVE DIVERTED FUNDS:
WHEN MUST THEY DISGORGE?
The position of the transferee of traditional trust funds vis-a-vis the
cestui que use may be summarized as follows: if the transferee receives the
funds with notice that the transfer was a diversion of the trust, he takes
subject to the trust.22 Transferees without notice may be subsumed under three
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, ch. 915.
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1907, ch. 360.
19. Bray Bros. v. Main Trust Co., 35 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
20. Century Indemnity Co. v. Bank of Gowanda, 35 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (Sup. Ct.
1941), aff'd, 35 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1942) (Mem.), reargument denied, 265 App. Div. 907, 38
N.Y.S.2d 318 (1942) (per curiam).
21. N.Y. Lien Law § 73.
22. III Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, § 288.
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broad catagories. The transferee who gives present value for the asset re-
ceived; those who receive the asset as payment of a prior indebtedness; and
finally, the donee. The position of the first above mentioned is protected by the
lien law statute which states that "Nothing in this article affects the rights of
a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument or of a purchaser in good
faith for value and without notice that a transfer to him is a diversion of trust
assets."123 This is, of course, a restatement of the common law.24 The trans-
feree who receives diverted assets in discharge of a prior debt is required to
return the diverted asset unless the consideration received consists of money
or a negotiable instrument.25 The rationale for this has been stated by the
New York Court of Appeals as follows: "It is absolutely necessary for
practical business transactions that the payee of money in due course of
business shall not be put upon inquiry at his peril as to the title of the payor.
Money has no ear-mark. . . . It would introduce great confusion into com-
mercial dealings if the creditor who receives money in payment of a debt is
subject to the risk of accounting therefor to a third person who may be able
to show that the debtor obtained it from him by felony or fraud." 20 The position
of the donee is that he takes the property subject to the trust and must return
it to the beneficiary.2 7 To hold otherwise would unjustly enrich him at the
cost of the beneficiary.
In dealing with diversions of lien law trust funds, and the accountability
of the recipients thereof, the most recurring and difficult problem is whether
the transferee was in possession of sufficient information to charge him with
"notice." The degree of percipience required on the part of a transferee of
regular trust funds is stated by Scott, "A third person has notice of a breach
of trust, although he does not have actual knowledge of it, if he knows facts
which under the circumstances would lead a reasonably intelligent and diligent
person to inquire whether the person with whom he is dealing is a trustee and,
if he is, whether he is committing a breach of trust and such inquiry when
pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would give him knowledge
or reason to know that the trustee is committing a breach of trust."2 8 This
test was applied by the New York Courts in the case of Bischofl v. Yorkville
Bank.2 19 In this case, the executor under a will deposited the estate's money
to his own name in the defendant bank. He then disbursed some of these
funds to the bank in discharge of his personal debt to it. The court found that
the bank had ample notice that these funds were diverted from the estate and
held it liable, stating,
23. N.Y. Lien Law.§ 72(1).
24. Cf. Uniform Fiduciaries Act, quaere; What would be the effect of this act upon
lien law trust fund recipients if the act were adapted in New York?
25. III Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, § 304.1.
26. Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N.Y. 183, 187 (1879).
27. I1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, § 289. However, this may not be true if he
has "changed his position", Ibid.
28. Id. § 297.
29. 218 N.Y. 106, 112 N.E. 759 (1916).
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Its participation in a diversion of them (trust funds) would result
from either (a) acquiring an advantage or benefit directly through or
from the diversions or (b) joining in a diversion, in which it was not
interested, with actual notice or knowledge that the diversion was
intended or was being executed, and thereby becoming privy to it.30
Before embarking upon an analysis of the cases dealing with the position
of parties who received diverted lien law trust funds the reader should recall
the quality of the business transaction from which these funds arise. The
trustee-contractor will likely be engaged in numerous construction jobs and
funds will be coming in from all these sources. On the various jobs, a variety
of subcontractors and materialmen will be job claimants. One who finances
the trustee-contractor often maintains a running account with him and receives
principal payments on past indebtedness without careful inquiry into the source
of these funds nor the status of the job claimants on the construction which
gave rise to the funds. It is often true that the contractor does not pay his
"subs" until he receives payment from the owner. Conversely, the "sub" may
not pay his materialmen until he receives payment. It is also somewhat
common for the parties to admit to payment they have not received in order
for their debtor to receive payment from the owner. They hope to be paid
from the money their debtor then receives. In fact, anyone who deals with a
contractor must know that his funds, in the main, relate to construction on
which he has unpaid suppliers and "subs" or upon which he will soon have
such creditors. The duty of the recipient to investigate this chameleon trust
which has such protean attributes cannot be set at too high a degree or the
construction industry would be impossibly burdened. The courts have recog-
nized these factors in numerous decisions. However, such a welter of other
reasons for not enforcing the trust have been given that it is a difficult task to
glean from the opinions the precise state of the law relating to "notice."
In Barclay v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co.3 1 a contractor made a
deposit of a check from the state of New York in his regular account. The
check arose from a construction job upon which there were unpaid job claim-
ants. The contractor soon after became insolvent. The bank off-set the funds
so deposited against the contractor's indebtedness. In a suit by unpaid material-
men against the bank the lower court observed that if the bank had notice that
this deposit was a trust fund it would be forced to disgorge, however,
The mere fact that it was a check on the state of New York is not
sufficient, even though the bank knew that the debtor had had finan-
cial difficulties and did work for the state and other public authorities.
It is also plain that these circumstances were not sufficient to compel
inquiry on the part of the bank to ascertain the character of the check
30. Id. at 112, 112 N.E. at 761.
31. 155 Misc. 684, 280 N.Y. Supp. 749 (1934), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 692, 277 N.Y.
Supp. 952, aff'd, 267 N.Y. 630, 196 N.E. 614 (1935).
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which was merely deposited in the ordinary course of business and
then waive its lien [banker's lien] .32
This decision was ultimately affirmed by the court of appeals, but solely on
the grounds of lack of notice. The only case in which the court of appeals
carefully discussed the nature of the lien law trust vis-a-vis a party who
received diverted trust funds was Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Fed. Bk. & Tr.
Co. 33 The facts were similar to those in Barclay.34 Here the court observed,
Nothing in the section bars the contractor from using the moneys
received for any purpose he may see fit provided he does not fail to
pay all such claims out of other moneys which he may then have or
which he may afterward receive; and nothing in the section bars a
banker from applying moneys, if on deposit in the contractor's account
at the bank, without inquiry, upon the contractor's indebtedness to
the bank.35
The court further stated,
the most that the statute does or was designed to do ... is to create
the possibility of a fiduciary relationship arising between the con-
tractor . . . and a possible subcontractor . . . . The statute does not
give rise to a fiduciary relationship . . . or, if once created, continue
it under any and all contingencies.3"
These statements may be classed as obiter dicta for the court ultimately
resolved the case on other grounds, i.e., no civil remedy for the enforcement
of the trust was created by the statute as it then existed. The 1942 amend-
ment added language stating that the trust might be enforced by a civil
action. 37 It should be noted that this amendment resolves the question upon
which the court rested its decision in Raymond, but it is not clear that the
amendment reached the question of "notice" discussed therein. "Notice" is
a creature of equity and the statute does not prescribe any tests to be applied.
The court of appeals has not made a pronunciamento on the subject since the
Raymond case. Lower courts have assumed that the 1942 amendment settled
all questions raised in Raymond and have held transferees liable.38 In American
Blower Corp. v. Talcott39 the appellate division held that a factor who received
as payment of its loans, checks made out from the owner to the contractor
could be forced to return the funds so received to the contractor's material-
32. Id. at 686, 280 N.Y. Supp. at 752.
33. 288 N.Y. 452, 43 N.E.2d 486 (1942), aff'd on rehearing, 290 N.Y. 611, 48 N.E.2d
709 (1943).
34. Barclay v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust, supra note 31.
35. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Fed. Bk. & Tr. Co., supra note 13, at 459, 43
N.E.2d at 489.
36. Ibid.
37. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, ch. 808, § 2.
38. American Blower Corp. v. Talcott, 18 Misc. 2d 1031, 194 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959),
aff'd, 11 A.D.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1960); Metropolitan Sand & Gravel Corp.
v. Lipson, 7 A.D.2d 916, 182 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1959).
39. Ibid.
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men. In so determining, the court ostensibly relied on the fact that the evidence
indicated the factor had "notice" these funds were diverted from job claimants.
It should be noted, however, that the factor received these funds under unfiled
assignments. This, under an entirely different section and theory of the
statute, would obligate the defendant. to return any moneys so received. 40 The
problem of "notice" of the lien law trust was effectively demonstrated by the
case of Gramatan-Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow.41 Here the contractor received two
checks from the owner and immediately. endorsed them over to the defendant
who well knew the source of the funds and that there might be unpaid material-
men. However, at the time of the transfer of the first check there were no
unpaid job claimants; at the time of transfer of the second, only a small sum
was due to a materialman. The plaintiff materialman sought to have a trust
imposed upon the entire sum represented by the two checks. The district court
held that, "The statutory trust arises only in the event that there are unpaid
claims outstanding and only to the extent of such claims.142 The circuit court
affirmed, citing as its authority the rationale of the Raymond case and reciting
the language therefrom previously discussed.43  The court found that the
1942 amendment did not affect that portion of the Raymond decision. It then
stated,
Finally, we submit that the validity of a payment by a contractor to
a third person must depend upon the situation as it exists when the
payment is received: that is, the payee does not hold it subject to a
condition subsequent that the contractor shall pay at their maturity
upon future claims as they may arise as the work progresses. If in-
valid, it is invalid at once; any other construction would make a trap
for those who dealt with the contractor.44
To this opinion of Justice Learned Hand, Justice Clark registered a heated
dissent in which he accused the majority of "judicial hostility"45 to the statute.
Section 70(3) of the 1959 amendment was enacted to overrule this
decision.40 The statute now declares that, "Every such trust shall commence
at the time when any asset thereof comes into existence whether or not there
shall be at that time any beneficiary of the trust."...
Note that nowhere in the statute is there any language which deals with
the imputation of "notice." It seems that this amendment does not completely
lay the ghost of Raymond and Koslow for the quotations taken from these
cases and recited earlier in this section could be invoked by the courts to find
that a person who receives lien law trust funds at a time when no bills are
40. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 418, § 15 (now N.Y. Lien Law § 73).
41. 143 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. den.,
353 U.S. 958.
42. Id. at 643.
43. 240 F.2d 523, 526.
44. Id. at 527.
45. Id. at 533.
46. 1959 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F) 54 (238).
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due to claimants could not be said to have had "notice' that the payment to
him was a diversion of trust assets. This is true in spite of the legislative fiat
which declares that the trust is then in existence.
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFIcERS, DMIECTORS AND AGENTS WHO AID
IN DIVERTING LIEN LAW TRUST FUNDS
A corporation which has received trust funds and paid them to others than
job claimants could do so through the action of its agents. There is no doubt
that such a diversion of traditional trust funds would result in the personal
liability of the officers who actively engaged in a known diversion.47 This
result follows even though the funds have been expended for proper corporate
purposes.48 The acts of the corporate officers are tortious and "there is no
such relation as principal and agent in a tort, '49 all participants are equally
liable.
This liability is not to be confused with that which may ensue when the
Ccorporate veil" is pierced to prevent the perpetration of a fraud.50 When
an officer is held lable by reason of a tort committed in service of the corpora-
tion, his liability rests upon quite different grounds. Here, the veil is not
pierced to transfix the real party in interest, rather the guilty officer is held
separately liable with his corporation as a joint tort feasor.r'
An important New York case which discussed individual liability for
corporate wrongs is Santa Barbara v. Avallone & Miele.52 Here the personal
liability of the corporate treasurer for allowing the disbursement and com-
mingling of a client's trust funds were in question. The plaintiff had entrusted
certain funds to the corporation under circumstances that made the corpora-
tion a trustee of an express trust. The corporation went bankrupt after using
these moneys for its own purpose. The defendant, Stefano Miele, had been the
treasurer of the corporation who had signed the checks which disbursed the
funds. There was no evidence to show where these funds had been spent, nor
was there any evidence that this defendant had knowledge of their character as
trust funds. The appellate division found Miele personally liable for the diver-
sion. The court of appeals reversed, stating,
If the defendant Miele had signed checks depleting this fund with
knowledge that a trust might be impressed upon the fund, he might
47. Fletcher, op. cit. supra, note 5.
48. 152 A.L.R. 696, 705, "By the great weight of authority it is recognized that
officers of a corporation are personally liable, or are jointly liable with the corporation,
to one whose money as property has been misappropriated or converted by them to the
uses of the corporation although they derived no personal benefit therefrom and acted
merely as agents of the corporation. The theory being that an agent cannot escape the
consequences of his tort by the fact that he committed the tort as agent of his principal."
49. Commercial Credit -Corp. v. Wells, 228 App. Div. 402, 405, 240 N.Y. Supp.
139, 143 (1930).
50. 1 Fletcher, -Cyclopedia Corporations § 41 (perm. ed.).
51. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wells, supra note 49.
52. 270 N.Y. 1, 199 N.E. 777 (1936), reversing 243 App. Div. 357, 277 N.Y. Supp.
233 (1935).
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be said to have acted as agent of the Avallone Corporation in com-
mitting such a breach, and he, as well as the Avallone Corporation,
could be held liable as a trustee de son tort. But Miele may be held
liable as an active participant in this wrong of the corporation only
if he participated as agent in the withdrawal of the money of the
plaintiff from the lire account or had knowledge that the moneys of
the plaintiff in the account had been placed in the "Dollar Account."53
This case is authority for the proposition that a corporate officer who connives
to breach an express trust of which his corporation is trustee will be held
personally liable in tort. It had previously been held that breach of a con-
structive or implied trust under such circumstances could yield the same result.
In the earlier case of Lynch v. Conger5 4 the corporation of which the defend-
ants were officers made a bargain with its corporate attorney whereby it
assigned to him the sum of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars from the settle-
ment he had negotiated for the corporation. When the money was paid to the
corporation, the defendant officers used the entire sum for their own purposes.
The court held them personally liable on the theory that,
It came into the hands of ... [the defendants] impressed with the
obligations of the trust, and they, without right or authority, with
full knowledge of the right that the plaintiff had acquired, took the
trust fund with the design of preventing him from obtaining it. The
Owego Bridge Company [defendant's corporation] is insolvent. Under
the circumstances, it would be strange indeed if these defendants did
not incur a personal liability for a breach of trust. Having willfully
and fraudulently violated a duty which equity and good conscience
laid upon them, there is no good reason why the plaintiff may not
receive of them the damages he has thereby sustained. 55
Having determined that participation in the breach of an express trust and a
constructive, or implied trust, will make the corporate officers liable, the New
York courts thereafter dealt, but sparsely, with the question in relation to the
breach of a statutory trust. Section 233 of the New York Real Property Law
declares that money deposited with a landlord as a deposit on a lease is to be
held in trust by the landlord and returned at the time of termination. In
Metropolitan Concession v. Mike's Restaurant56 decided by the City Court of
New York, the defendant was the sole person in control of a corporation which
commingled and abstracted such trust funds. The court with little discussion
held him personally liable. A contrary decision on similar facts was reached
in D'Anato v. Licit Realty Corp.57 where the court cited as controlling the
fact that the plaintiff dealt with the defendant in his capacity as a corporate
officer. There was a dissent in which the opinion that fraud was practised by
53. Id. at 6, 199 N.E. at 779.
54. 181 App. Div. 221, 168 N.Y. Supp. 855 (1917), aff'd, 229 N.Y. 543, 129 N.E.
908 (1920) (mem.).
55. Id. at 227, 168 N.Y: Supp. at 858.
56. 54 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
57. 48 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1944).
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the defendant was thought to warrant the imposition of personal liability.
However, it should be noted that neither the majority nor the dissent con-
sidered the effect of Section 233; there is no indication in the opinion that the
plaintiff's counsel raised this point.
The primary question as to whether an action will lie against a corporate
officer who can be proven to have been active in diverting lien law trust
funds is whether the court will find, under the present statute, any legislative
authority for such an action. It must be borne in mind that these "trust funds"
are solely a creature of the legislature and the courts have delimited their effect
in many decisions. 58 The amendments of the statute have most often been
effected in order to overrule a case strictly interpreting the laws prior provi-
sions. 9 Since 1930 the penal section of the statute has provided that "any
officer, director or agent of such trustee who applies or consents to the applica-
tion of trust funds" 60 is guilty of a crime."' It was held in numerous cases
that no civil action was created thereby in the event of a breach of the trust,
the creditors sole remedy was the criminal action. 2 The 1942 amendment
added the following language, "Such trust may be enforced by a civil action
maintained as provided in Article 3-a of this Chapter by any person entitled
to share in the fund . ... 63 It is strange that few cases, and those in
minor courts, have been reported in which a civil claim was brought against a
corporate officer for diverting lien law trust funds. In Mintzes Const. Co. v.
Gasson64 it was said,
It is incredible that the Legislature intended to permit enforcement
of the trust declared by Lien Law § 36 only against a corporate owner
and not against its officers, directors, employees or agents who
knowingly actually perpetrated the acts of diversion, particularly
where they were alleged to have profited personally in their acts.
The court therefore held him liable. This would seem to be the inescapable
conclusion of the language of the statute as it then existed. It also appears that
the element of personal profit to the corporate officers is not a necessary
element for the criminal sanctions do not require that the person acting for
the corporation in diversion do so for his own profit but only that he has in
fact applied to or consented in a "diversion." The 1959 amendment removed
these criminal provisions of the penal law. 5 In so doing, the language added
by the 1942 amendment relating to civil remedies was eliminated. These are
58. Id. at 48.
59. 1959, 1958 and 1942 Leg. Docs., supra note 10.
60. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 859, § 36.
61. Ibid.
62. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Fed. Bk. & Tr. Co., supra note 13.
63. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, ch. 808, § 2.
64. N.Y. Law Journal, Oct. 8, 1957, p. 14 col 1T, reported in 21 Clark's Digest-
Annotator 500.418-3. In Ridgefield Supply Co. v. Rosen, 1 Misc. 2d 675, 147 N.Y.S.2d
337 (Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1955), the court, with little discussion held a corporate officer person-
ally liable for the diversion of lien law trust funds.
65. N.Y. Penal Law § 1302-c.
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now meant to be covered by Section 77(1) of the Lien Law, which in general
terms affirms the right to a civil remedy. It is possible to maintain that the
legislature has thus inadvertently eliminated the cause of action against a
corporate officer who aids or consents to a diversion of trust funds. This could
be argued as the new Section 77(1) states only that "A trust arising under this
article may be enforced by the holder of any trust claims." If a technical view
be taken by the courts it may be held that Section 1302(c) of the penal law
does not "arise under this article," and since the civil remedy provisions were
struck from the language of the statute making officers, directors and agents
civilly liable for diversions, it is possible to infer that the law is back to its
pre-1942 holding, i.e., no civil action can be maintained against the individual
corporate officers.
Counter arguments are available to this interpretation. First, the history
of the '59 amendment does not indicate that such was the intent of the legis-
lature. 6 Second, Section 77(3) (a) (1) implies the existence of a civil action
in such a case as it states "The relief granted in any action may include any or
all of the following (1) . . . to recover damages for a breach of trust or
participation therein." It is difficult to predict what will be the attitude of
the judiciary to this question. The courts have appeared to be hostile to
legislation dealing with the entire subject of the lien law trust.67 However,
only the most technical analysis could result in a holding of no civil liability.
The hostile attitude of courts to the lien law remedies have been most often
evoked in cases which, by the application of new theories of the lien law trust,
tended to upset traditional business practices.6 8 The courts are loath to force
innocent parties to disgorge moneys for which they have given money's worth
and received with some quantum of good faith. These considerations would not
apply when a suit of the above described nature were brought against an
officer who was an accessory to the diversion complained of.
STATUS OF A CLAIM IN BANKRUPTcY AGAINST LIEN LAW TRUST FUNDS
The nature of the job creditors claim against the estate of his bankrupt
debtor has been the subject of many and contradictory decisions. 69 As is
universally true in seeking a solution in this area, an analysis of the properties
of this legislative "trust" must be compared to that of a traditional trust in a
similar situation. The position of the latter is clear; if the beneficiary can
trace his fund in the assets of the bankrupt, his absolute right to reclaim
them as his own property is uncontradicted.70
66. 1959 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F) (passim).
67. See dissent in Gramatan-Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow, supra note 41, 240 F.2d at 527.
68. E.g. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Fed. Bk. & Tr. Co., supra note 13. Gramatan-
Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow, supra note 41.
69. Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 116 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1940); In re
McDonald, 163 F. Supp. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Heintzelman Const. Co., 34 F. Supp.
109 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); See generally 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 1 67.25(2) (4th ed. 1956).
70. Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 221.1, "The trustee in bankruptcy is not a bona
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The "trust" created by the lien law has, however, very different properties
from the ordinary trust. The trustee of an express trust may not commingle
trust funds with his general funds. 71 He must treat all beneficiaries of the same
class with strict impartiality.7Y2 The crime of diversion is committed the
instant he uses the funds for an improper purpose.73  None of the above
statements apply to a lien law trustee. He may commingle with impunity7
4
favor one trust claimant over all others,75 and cannot be indicted for abstract-
ing funds if he promptly repays the money.7 6 It is little wonder that courts
have often reached conclusions on the nature of the lien law trust as divergent
as the six blind men describing an elephant.
77
There are three discernible lines of cases which characterize the rights of
the lien law trust claimant into as many different statuses. First, there is the
theory that the filing of a proper notice of lien is a prerequisite to any favored
position in bankruptcy. 78 Any question remaining should be settled by the
present language of the lien law which awards a trust beneficiary status to a
job claimant, "Whether or not they have filed or had the right to file a
notice of lien . . ... 79 A second line of cases would award to a job creditor
who had not filed a notice of lien, the same rights as afforded to those who
duly filed notices.8 0 (Presumably his relative priorities vis-a-vis other job
claimants would also be determined by state law.) The third line of cases was
illustrated by the decision in the Heintzelman case.8 ' This was simply that the
moneys which came to the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy which were
lien law trust funds should be treated as traditional trust funds. This rather
startling theory was criticized by a number of authors on the grounds that such
a favored treatment would contradict the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
Particularly,
In view of the elimination of all state created priorities but one in
§ 64(a)5 and the avowed purpose of § 67c to implement the policy
fide purchaser. In the case of formal trusts the trust property does not even vest in
the trustee in bankruptcy, and in the case of other trusts, although the legal title to the
property vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, he holds it subject to the trust. On the bank-
ruptcy of the trustee the beneficiary is entitled to recover the trust property which is
traceable and thus is entitled to priority over the general creditors of the trustee as long
as the trust property or its product can be traced."
71. II Scott, Trusts § 179.1 (2d ed. 1956).
72. Id. at § 183.
73. People v. Shears, 158 App. Div. 577, 143 N.Y.S. 861, aff'd, 209 N.Y. 610, 103
N.E. 1129 (1913).
74. N.Y. Lien Law § 75.
75. N.Y. Lien Law § 74.
76. Gramatan-Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow, supra note 41, 240 F.2d at 525.
77. Saxe, The Blind Man and the Elephant, Stevenson, Home Book of Verse, 1877
(9th ed. 1955).
78. In re McDonald, supra note 69; Cf. Saltser & Weinser v. Monroe Plumbing &
Heating Supply Corp., 265 App. Div. 821, 37 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1942), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 903, 50
N.E.2d 299 (1943).
79. N.Y. Lien Law § 71(4).
80. Ricotta v. Burns Coal & Building Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1959),
reversing 62 F. Supp. 214 (W.D.N.Y.). See generally 3 Colliers, Bankruptcy II 60.22, n.1.
81. In re Heintzelman, supra note 69.
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of § 64(a) by striking at statutory liens indistinguishable from priori-
ties, there is reason for treating the statutory trust in the same case
as its functional equivalent, the statutory lien, so far as bankruptcy
is concerned.82
This criticism seems well taken for it is logical that the state should not be
allowed to upset the plan of the Bankruptcy Act by denominating certain
relationships as creating a "trust" and impressing the funds arising therefrom
with a "statutory trust."
The relationships between the owner, contractor and materialmen but for
the statute are basically of the nature of debtor and creditor. The several states
may wish to protect a class of creditors by making the debtor a "statutory
trustee" and making criminal his technical "defalcations." But such devices
if recognized as traditional trusts within the federal bankruptcy laws would
create a significant breach in the structure of the entire act. The status of
the trustee in bankruptcy is that of the hypothetical "ideal creditor" and his
rights against those claiming liens or priorities are governed by the rights
afforded to such an "ideal creditor" within the state in which he acts.8 3 The
position of the federal government as a tax gatherer is ordinarily superior to
that of the trustee in bankruptcy. To remove an asset from his grip, the
adverse claimant must show that his claim was "choate" at the time when the
federal tax lien was filed.8 This requirement had been held to be extremely
strict and a high degree of manucaption of the asset on the part of the claimant
was required before the collector would accede to his claim.8 5
The above analysis describes generally the state of the law before the
recent Supreme Court decision in the Aqulino8 and Durham Lumber"7 cases,
which decisions endorse, apparently without qualification, the rationale of the
Heintzelman8 case. The Aquilino case arose in the courts of New York and
dealt with the status of a lien law trust fund claimant vis-a-vis the Director
of Internal Revenue. Here the job claimants of a failed contractor filed their
82. 4 Collier, op. cit. supra note 69. Cf. 50 Yale L.J. 1268, 1272 (1949), "Although
it is clear that the New York Statute [Lien Law] was not purposefully framed to compass
an evasion of the Bankruptcy Act, the trust fund device lends itself admirably to such a
use. Unless it is properly restricted now, the carefully designed scheme enacted in 1938 to
regulate the incidence of statutory liens on the bankrupt estate is useless in what promises
to be an expanding category of claims."
83. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.CA. § 110(a)(5) (1953),
"[The trustee in bankruptcy may claim] . . . property, including rights of action, which
prior to the filing of the petition [the bankrupt] could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or
otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered....
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6321-22, Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.A. § 191
(1954). For a discussion of the anomaly existing in this area see 4 Collier, Bankruptcy
5f 67.24(2) (14th ed. 1956).
85. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. White
Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955). See gen-
erally A.B.A. Final Report of the Committee on Federal Liens (1959).
86. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
87. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
88. In re Heintzelman, supra note 69.
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mechanics liens after the Director of Internal Revenue filed his tax lien. The
claimants brought a foreclosure action in the New York Supreme Court and
the government was permitted to intervene. The lower court held that the
tax lien was improperly filed under New York law, therefore the mechanics
lien took precedence;8 9 the appellate division affirmed but on the theory of
Heintzelman, reasoning that these "trust funds" were not the property of the
contractor, but rather, of his job claimants.90 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the tax lien had taken effect prior to the mechanics lien and that
they were bound by federal decisions precluding them from treating these
moneys as "trust funds.""' Certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted. The
Court determined that the question of whether there was anything to which
the tax lien could attach was to be determined by state law. This required a
remand to the New York Court of Appeals for its determination. In so
holding the Supreme Court stated,
Relying upon the express language of section 36-a of the Lien Law
and upon a number of New York court decisions interpreting that
statute, petitioners conclude that the money actually received by the
contractor-taxpayer and his right to collect amounts still due under
the construction contract constitute a direct trust for the benefit of
subcontractors, and that the only property rights which the contractor-
taxpayer has in the trust are bare legal title to any money actually
received and a beneficial interest in so much of the trust proceeds as
remains after the claims of subcontractors have been settled. The
government, on the other hand, claims that section 36-a merely gives
the subcontractor an ordinary lien, and that the contractor taxpayers
property rights encompass the entire indebtedness of the owner under
the construction contract.
The conflict should not be resolved by this court, but by the
highest court of the State of New York .... 
92
The Durham case arose in a North Carolina bankruptcy court on facts
similar to Aquilino. The North Carolina lien statute gave a direct cause of
action to unpaid subcontractors against owners for the amount remaining due
to the contractor. The referee in bankruptcy found, under the law of North
Carolina, that the tax liens were superior. A reversal was ordered by the
circuit court of appeals based upon a review of North Carolina law which
lead them to conclude that a contractor had an interest in the fund due to
him from the owner limited by the amount remaining after all job claimants
had been paid.9 3 The Supreme Court affirmed this holding and emphasized
that it was not inclined to disturb the findings of North Carolina law reached
by the circuit court of appeals sitting in that state since it was more knowledg-
89. 140 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
90. 2 A.P.2d. 747, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1956).
91. 3 N.Y.2d 511, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957).
92. Aquilino v. United States, supra note 86, at 514-5.
93. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958).
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able in that law than the Supreme Court. In a revealing footnote the Court
observed,
This case points up the distinction we drew in Aquilino. The facts
here show how it simply begs the question to suggest that the principle
of the lien-priority cases is somehow subverted or evaded by recogniz-
ing that what constitutes the taxpayers property in the first place is a
question of state law. The facts show, too, that it does not promote
clarity to substitute, for the property interests created by state law, a
rule of federal property law, the main feature of which seems to be an
inquiry into what the consequences would be if state law were different
from what it in fact is.94
Justice Harlan wrote a dissent to both decisions in a single opinion in
which Justice Black concurred. 95 The dissent stressed those principles of law
which had heretofore been considered as controlling, i.e., to precede a federal
tax lien the claimant must have reduced his claim to a "choate" condition and
that the test to be applied in determining the priority of the federal tax lien
should always be determined by federal law. The dissenters strongly implied
that the New York Court of Appeals would favor the claimants over the gov-
ernment. Justice Harlan stated,
I venture to suggest that on remand, the Court of Appeals can with
equal facility label the subcontractors' interests "properties" or a
"lien," the relevant incidents of the relationship being the same in
either case. Why should not that court and the legislatures of other
states readily respond in choosing the former alternative?96
To conclude, if the New York Court does so determine, it would seem an
obvious corallary that the trustee in bankruptcy of a contractor would have
no "property" rights in the accounts of his bankrupts which accounts were
subject to identification as "lien law trust funds." Therefore, a job claimant
of a bankrupt contractor, owner or subcontractor might claim all identifiable
funds held by the trustee as assets held for the benefit of himself and his
class; thereby barring all non-trust fund claimants from participation in this
part of the bankrupt's estate.
STATUS OF THE LIEN LAW TRUSTEE WHo DIVERTS; Is His OBLIGATION
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY?
The statute declares that funds arising by reason of an improvement to
real property are trust funds and must be used in the discharge of trust claims; 97
if these funds are expended by the trustee for any other purpose, a diversion
has occurred. 98 The trustee who diverts is likely to be in financial extremis
at the time. His corporation's, or his own, bankruptcy may be imminent.
94. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., supra note 87, at 526 n.4.
95. Id. at 516.
96. Id. at 521.
97. N.Y. Lien Law § 70.
98. N.Y. Lien Law § 72(1); N.Y. Penal Law § 1302-c.
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If bankruptcy ensues it must be determined if his obligation resulting from
misuse of trust funds survives a discharge. Certain genera of claims against a
defaulting fiduciary have been held to be dischargeable, others have not. To
determine the status in bankruptcy of a lien law trustee who diverts, an assess-
ment of the nature of this statutory trust is required, and its properties must
be compared to that of the various common law trusts. To illuminate this
area an inquiry into the status of various common law trustees must be
attempted, and the liability of the statutory trustee with whom we are now
dealing must be subsumed under the dischargeable or non-dischargeable variety.
The Bankruptcy Act states that claims founded upon certain types of
liabilities will not be discharged by bankruptcy. For the purpose of our
discussion, these comprise Sections 17(2) and 17(4) of the Act.99 The former
bars from discharge liabilities founded upon "wilful and malicious injuries";
the latter, Section 17(4), from the bankrupt's, "fraud, embezzlement, mis-
appropriations or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity." The statute is designed to relieve a hopelessly insolvent person from
his past debts and, with certain exceptions, to allow him a tabla rasa for the
future. An alert creditor can often claim that his discharged debtor was guilty
of a technical conversion or had become a trustee ex maleficio by reason of
breach of a constructive or implied trust and thus attempt to bring his claim
within the exception. The courts have wisely decided that these devices of the
common law, often a heritage from other centuries and the solution to problems
now long interred, should not operate to the detriment of the object of the
Bankruptcy Act. However, certain types of trustees owe their cestuis far
greater duties than are found between debtors and their creditors. If such
trustees convert or divert their beneficiaries' funds, the Bankruptcy Act will
not afford them a refuge. The controlling decision on the dischargeability of
claims was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Aetna
Acceptance Co.' Here, Davis, the defendant, floor planned automobiles under
a trust receipts arrangement. He gave his supplier an agreement to hold
autos and the receipts from their sale, in trust. He also gave a chattel
mortgage, a promissory note, and an agreement not to sell without the prior
consent of Aetna, his supplier. Davis sold some cars out of trust, converted
the funds to his own use, and soon after went bankrupt. Aetna sued and when
met with a defense of discharge in bankruptcy, claimed that its cause of action
was based upon non-dischargeable grounds. The opinion of Justice Cardozo
removed this case from section 17(2) by citing the multitude of documents
signed by Mr. Davis; promissory notes, chattels mortgages, agreements, all
of which were largely ignored by the parties in their day to day dealing.
The Court concluded that the defendant's diversion could not therefore amount
99. 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2), (4) (Supp. 1960).
1. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
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to a "wilful and malicious" act. In dealing with the second point raised by the
plaintiff under Section 17 (4) the Court observed that to be a "fiduciary" under
the Act, "He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference
thereto." 2 This language has been interpreted to mean that a "fiduciary
debt" to be excepted from discharge must be based on the breach of a technical
or express trust, not that of a trustee ex maleficio.3 The cases interpreting
Sections 17(2) and 17(4) have tried to follow this abstruse dichotomy. If the
relation between the parties is bottomed on a relationship basically that of a
traditional debtor and creditor, the debtor will be discharged of his obligation.4
When, however, the debtor's obligation arises as a result of his arrant moral
turpitude, or is occasioned by a calculated course of conduct indicating an
intent to appropriate another's property, the court will refuse to grant a
discharge.5
The lien law trustee is a creature sui generis in the trust law. As recited
earlier, his powers and duties differ greatly from those of an ordinary trustee.
It will clearly be difficult to determine his position as a discharged bankrupt
if he diverts statutory trust funds and claim is made upon him after discharge
as a defalcating fiduciary or as one who has committed a "wilful and malicious"
injury. To focus more clearly on the question, assume arguendo that there
is no criminal penalty for diverting lien law trust funds. In such a case the
lien law trustee would be in a curious position within the test given by Judge
Cardozo in the Aetna case. He would be a trustee "before the wrong" (the
law makes him this) 6 but not "without reference thereto." For the wrong of
the diversion takes place when he disburses funds to others than trust fund
beneficiaries.7 In fact, if he replaces the funds, no technical violation has
occurred. 8 However, his position would appear to be equivalent to a trustee
under the Trust Receipts act.9 Such persons have been freely granted dis-
charges after converting trust receipts. 10 It is the addition of criminal penal-
ties which change the complexion and nature of his diversion to a genus of
wrong which is likely to be held non-dischargeable.
2. Id. at 333.
3. Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1929); Levine v. Levine, 262 App.
Div. 749, 27 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1941); Riefler Buick, Inc. v. Johnson, 148 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1955). See generally the discussion in 98 A.L.R. 1458.
4. E.g. Bloomingdale v. Dreher, supra note 3.
5. E.g. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916).
6. N.Y. Lien Law § 70.
7. N.Y. Lien Law § 72.
8. Gramatan-Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow, 240 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir. 1957).
9. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 50.-58-.
10. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co, supra note 1; Bloomingdale v. Dreher, supra
note 3; Cf. Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202; 42 A.L.R.2d 896. Note that the
holding of the cases relating to trust receipts might now be different since the 1958
enactment of N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 58-m which renders felonious the diversion of trust
receipts assets. However, another section of the law [§ 51(14)] states, "The use of the word
'trustee' herein shall not be interpreted or construed to imply the existence of a trust or any
right or duty of a trustee in the sense of equity jurisprudence other than as provided by
this article".
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There are no reported cases which have passed upon this particular ques-
tion; however, the legislature has previously applied criminal penalties to
other types of malaversions, discussion of the court's treatment of such cases
will help in assessing the lien law question. The New York Court of Appeals
had opportunity to deal with a series of cases which considered the status,
after bankruptcy, of stockbrokers who misapplied their customer's property.
These cases contained almost identical properties, the only variable being the
addition to the criminal law of provisions which made the act complained of
a felony. In Wood v. Fisk1 the defendant stockbroker repledged the plaintiff's
stock to an amount in excess of his authority so to do. The defendant could
not meet his obligation on the debt secured by his stock and it was sold by
the sub-pledgee. After the defendant received his discharge in bankruptcy,
the plaintiff brought suit against him. During the interval between these
happenings and the time the case reached the Court of Appeals, the criminal
law was amended to make felonious a wrongful re-pledge such as this. Judge
Cardozo, who was later to write the decision in Aetna, wrote the opinion for
the court in which he concluded that no "wilful and malicious" act had been
consummated when the wrongful repledge of plaintiff's stock occurred. He then
stated ". . . whether this would be true today, since the enactment of recent
statutes under which the wrongful repledge of securities by stockbrokers is
made a felony . . . [we] do not now decide."' 2 The case of Heaphy v. Kerr's
soon arose in which the court was presented with the identical question, how-
ever, here the wrongful repledge occurred after the addition to the criminal
law. The appellate division of the First Department analyzed closely the
Cardozo opinion in Wood v. Fisk and on this basis determined,
Applying analogous reasoning to the case at bar, the Legislature had
deemed a wrongful repledge of securities by brokers so gross an injury
as to make it, not a misdemeanor, but a felony, and when, in defiance
of that statute, as well as in defiance of the legal rights of the plaintiff,
these securities were repledged for an amount largely in excess of the
plaintiff's indebtedness to the defendants, we think that the wrong
may fairly be deemed a wilful and malicious injury to property, the
claim for which is not discharged in bankruptcy.14
The court of appeals affirmed without opinion. The analogy of these decisions
to the case of a lien law trustee who diverts trust funds and later seeks a dis-
charge in bankruptcy is immediately apparent. However, the court of appeals
subsequently severely circumscribed the ambit of the Heaphy decision and
shifted the focus of inquiry from one of substantive law to one of evidence.
In Brown v. Hoyt'5 the stockbroker failed to prevent the plaintiff's stock from
11. 215 N.Y. 233, 109 NE. 177 (1915).
12. Id. at 241, 109 N.E. at 179.
13. 190 App. Div. 810, 180 N.Y. Supp. 542 (1920), aff'd mem., 232 N.Y. 526, 134
N.E. 557 (1921).
14. Id. at 812, 180 N.Y. Supp. at 544.
15. 145 Misc. 915, 261 N.Y. Supp. 355 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd sub nom. Brown v.
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being commingled with his own and repledged as security. When the broker
could not meet his obligations, the hypothecated stocks were sold. After the
broker received a discharge in bankruptcy, the owner of the stocks sued, relying
squarely on Heaphy. The testimony in Brown v. Hoyt indicated that the de-
fendant's clerk had negligently commingled the plaintiff's stock certificates
with those owned by the defendant. This convinced the trial court that no
"wilful or malicious" injury was intended. The court observed that the appel-
late division in Heaphy had found as a fact violation of the penal law. In
distinguishing these facts the court stated,
Such a violation is not shown here, by a preponderance of proof, or by
any degree of proof, or by anything other than speculation as to how
hypothecation of plaintiff's stock occurred. Though we give full con-
sideration to the fact that the brokers were wholly without authority
to use plaintiff's securities as well as to the difficulties confronting him
as an outsider, in proving what may have occurred inside defendant's
office, we are still confronted with a record as consistent with a finding
of innocent mistake as with one of "wilful and malicious" injury.16
The appellate division reversed, being of the opinion that the defendant
could not exculpate himself by delegating his responsibility to his clerk.
17
The court of appeals overruled the appellate division and re-instated the
determination made by the trial court.' 8 The majority, agreed with the reason-
ing of the trial judge, while the dissent endorsed the rational of the appellate
division.19
If a similar question arises under the lien law trust fund, this line of cases
appear to be the most apt in which to search for precedents. 20 If the present
constituents of the court of appeals follow these cases and apply them to the
lien law trust problem, the following prognosis is offered. A defendant trustee
who allows a diversion of lien law trust funds will be afforded relief in bank-
ruptcy to such claims unless the claimant can prove that the diversion was
intentional and that the defendant was aware of the diversion.
The above analysis and decisions apply to the case of an individual or
Garey, 241 App. Div. 370, 272 N.Y. Supp. 312 (1934), rev'd, 267 N.Y. 167, 196 N.E. 12(1935).
16. Id. at 917, 261 N.Y. Supp. at 357.
17. Brown v. Garey, supra note 15.
18. Brown v. Garey, supra note 15.
19. Ibid.
20. Another area from which analogy can be drawn is that of a corporate officer
who makes payments in violation of N.Y. Stock 'Corp. Law § 15. The obligation founded
on such violations was found non-dischargeable in Matter of Bernard, 87 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1937); Kaufman v. Lederfine, 49 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); In re Adelson, 187 Misc.
691, 65 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Also, many states impress a statutory trust upon
the funds received by an insurance broker from his clients for the purpose of paying
premiums. In the following cases a diversion of these funds have been held non-dis-
chargeable; Morgan v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 210 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1954)
(finding statute created "technical or express" trust); Travelers Ins. Co, v. Bishop, 298
Mich. 600, 299 N.W. 731 (1941); American Surety Co. of New York v. Greenwald, 223
Minn. 37, 25 N.W.2d 681 (1946) (finding "express" trust).
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non-corporate trustee. The continuing liability after bankruptcy of a cor-
porate officer or agent who takes part in the diversion of trust funds for
which his corporation is trustee, poses a different problem. His liability, civil2 '
or criminal, 22 must be founded upon his consent to the application of trust funds
to a non-trust purpose. This factor negates the problem posed in Brown v.
Hoyt for if a corporate officer's participation cannot be proven, no civil action
-against him will lie; if it can be proven the test of Brown v. Hoyt must
necessarily be met. Another factor enters into an analysis of this question
when the case of a corporate officer relying upon his discharge in bankruptcy
is presented. Certain language of the Bankruptcy Act not applicable to an
individual trustee may operate to bar him from an effective discharge. The
conversions of an individual which may not be discharged have been subsumed
under the "wilful and malicious" ruberic found in Section 17(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. The courts have not been inclined to characterize such
malaversions as a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.23 However,
the Bankruptcy Act also states that various misappropriations will not be dis-
charged if the bankrupt was, at the time, "acting as an officer."124 This has
been interpreted to include an officer of a private corporation. 25 It would
therefore be arguable that an officer who consented to the use of trust assets
for a non-trust purpose, even though such use did not redound to his own
benefit, might be unable to discharge this liability in bankruptcy.20
The use of the statutory trust by state legislatures has become increasingly
more popular. Its use has frustrated Federal objectives in the field of tax
collections, bankruptcy administrations and now bids fair to interfere with
the very raison d'etre of the bankruptcy act; i.e., relieving indigent debtors
of their burdens. Ultimately the Supreme Court must deal with this question
and although it has recently acquiesced in affording certain favored positions
to claimants of statutory trust funds, 27 it is not thought by this author that
the Court will allow the entire structure of the bankruptcy act to be placed in
hazard by the recognition of the statutory trust.
CONCLUSION
The device of the statutory trust may well have as decided an impact upon
the law as that of the dawn of the trust concept many hundreds of years ago
for the legislative creation of a species of trust relationship between a tradi-
21. Cf. Santa Barbara v. Avallone & Miele, 270 N.Y. 1, 199 N.E. 777 (1936).
22. N.Y. Penal Law § 1302-c.
23. E.g. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., supra note 1.
24. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(4), 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a)(4).
25. Matter of Bernard, supra note 20; Kaufman v. Lederfine, supra note 20; In re
Adelson, supra note 20.
26. Metropolitan Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Lipson, 7 A.D.2d 916, 182 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1959) (semble) (dictum).
27. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
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tional debtor and creditor cannot help but result in myriad ramifications,
some of which may be unanticipated by the framers. The courts of the land
have, in the main, taken their traditional conservative view of the interloper.
In the course of future interpretations and amendment, a body of "statutory
trust" law will no doubt evolve through much the same fashion as did the
tenets of traditional trust precepts. The prophecies offered herein are not put
forward in any spirit of definitiveness, nor do they purport to the weight of an
encyclical. Any practising attorney or scholar can, no doubt, offer alternative
approaches and solutions not considered in this paper, the ambit for imagina-
tion and analysis being very broad in this as yet undetermined field. In ap-
proaching a problem dealing with "statutory trust" as found in the lien law, one
submission is tendered; the relation between debtors, creditors, officers of
creditors and transferees and' the rights and duties of each to the other,
may be properly defined by the state legislatures. However, when these de-
terminations trench upon areas clearly reserved to the federal government,
it can be expected that the Court or the Congress will act to circumscribe the
extent to which the statutory trust will affect the federal power.
